With or without you

This is perhaps the clearest indication yet that the US president is walking away from his efforts to strike a peace deal. It also suggests that he has given up on a separate deal with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. But this is where the good news ends — and where the European-led coalition of the willing will need to deliver security and stability for the continent in an ever more volatile environment.

After several weeks of Russian incursions into NATO airspace, drones — thought highly likely to be linked to Russia — twice disrupted Danish airspace in the vicinity of Copenhagen airport. It felt like a presentiment of the dystopian drone wars predicted by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in his speech at the UN General Assembly in New York on 24 September. Putin’s continuing provocations are a brazen challenge to Kyiv’s European allies. At the heart of this coalition of the willing, the European Union certainly has demonstrated it is willing to flex its rhetorical muscles to rise to this challenge.

EU institutions in Brussels have never left any doubt about their determination that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine “needs to end with a just and lasting peace for Ukraine”, as Ursula von der Leyen, the EU commission president, put it most recently in her state-of-the-union address. Beyond rhetoric, however, the coalition of the willing is facing a number of potential problems. Individually, none of them is insurmountable, but taken together they illustrate the unprecedented challenge Kyiv’s European allies are facing.

To begin with, the coalition of the willing is not a coherent body. Its membership includes members of NATO and the EU, as well as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea. But the United States is not among their number. It grew from eight countries plus the EU and NATO in February, to 33 participants in April, and 39 in September. Its relationship with the 57-member Ukraine Defence Contact Group of countries supporting Kyiv with military equipment, which held its 30th meeting in early September, is not entirely clear. 

The lack of coherence in membership is mirrored by different levels of commitment, whether that’s the willingness to deploy a reassurance force after a ceasefire in Ukraine — or the capacity. It’s also not entirely clear whether the leaders of the EU and NATO are speaking for all members of their organisations. Among EU and NATO members, Hungary and Slovakia, for example, have taken ambiguous stances when it comes to defending Europe against Russia.

These different levels of commitment also reflect partially conflicting priorities. European members of NATO are deeply — and not wrongly — concerned about US abandonment. Add to that fears of a disastrous trade war, and placating Donald Trump becomes a priority.

Doing so by buying US arms may please Trump and plug gaps in Europe’s ability to supply Ukraine. But it is perhaps not the best way of ensuring the urgently needed development of the independent European defence-industrial base.

Trump’s return to the White House swiftly ushered in the end of US largesse in support of Ukraine. Europeans have only partly filled that gap, with Germany taking the lead and the EU mobilising over €10 billion in its current budget to 2027, with the aim to supplement efforts by member countries. But it’s not clear how long these efforts will be sustainable in light of inflation and domestic spending pressures. France’s public finances are in distress, while Spain has openly defied NATO’s 5% spending target.

Part of the solution to these problems would be much swifter defence-industrial cooperation across the coalition, including with Ukraine. Over time, this could help to build the indigenous defence-industrial capacity needed to produce military equipment at the scale needed. But making up for critical gaps in manpower, dealing with the Russian drone threat, strengthening air defences and long-range strike capabilities, and replacing the potential loss of US intelligence support will not happen overnight.

Individual countries and the various multilateral forums in which they cooperate will need to decide how to balance three only partially aligned priorities. Europe — whether defined as EU, European NATO members, or the core of the coalition of the willing — urgently needs to upgrade its defences. Developing a European defence-industrial capacity at scale is integral to this.

Europeans also need to keep the US engaged as much as possible, literally by buying Trump off, because they currently lack critical capabilities that will take time for them to develop themselves. And while building better defence capabilities for themselves they will need to keep Ukraine in the fight against Russia to keep it from losing the war. 

Europe needs to increase the money, develop the military muscle, and build decision-making mechanisms that are not mired in procrastination to win the proxy war that the Kremlin forced on Ukraine and its allies. To do so will ensure that Europeans are best placed to prevent Russia from broadening its war against Ukraine into a full-blown military confrontation with the west.